Terrific, fresh new look at the Cuban Missile Crisis, which very nearly took the world to nuclear war in October 1962. Dobbs takes a closer look at information that has gradually been declassified over the last few decades and concludes that many of the myths about the Crisis are either exaggerated or downright false. And he shows that numerous individuals much lower on the totem poll than...
more Terrific, fresh new look at the Cuban Missile Crisis, which very nearly took the world to nuclear war in October 1962. Dobbs takes a closer look at information that has gradually been declassified over the last few decades and concludes that many of the myths about the Crisis are either exaggerated or downright false. And he shows that numerous individuals much lower on the totem poll than Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro played vital roles in the crisis - generals, pilots, politicians, etc.
Dobbs also examines the numerous examples of misunderstanding or miscommunication during the Crisis that had enormous consequences Here's an example from the book of you probably never knew: Khrushchev felt pressured to announce dismantling of the missiles (and back down) the night after "Black Saturday" because he was erroneously informed by his own intelligence service that Kennedy was planning to go on American television within hours to announce an invasion of Cuba. Determined to avoid nuclear war, Khrushchev had his staff working at a frantic pace on a press release to broadcast over the radio (in effect ending the crisis) before Kennedy could make his speech. But no television address by Kennedy was planned - the KGB simply goofed.
Dobbs also looks at how the false lesson for the US about the Crisis - how American will could supposedly back down a powerful adversary - had huge consequences later for America in Vietnam and even Iraq, where later presidents believed that simply acting tough and determined (like JFK in 1962) were enough win conflicts. But basically, both Kennedy and Khrushchev backed down in 1962, despite the myths, and the real lesson of the Crisis, lost on Lyndon Johnson and George W. Bush, was that conflict was averted because leaders reconsidered their initial tough stances. Sadly, this is not the lesson learned.
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